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This Issue Brief, prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, examines the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) and its 
application to managed care. The ADA provides important protections for persons with 
disabilities who are members of managed care arrangements, regardless of whether their 
membership is sponsored by an employer, Medicare, or Medicaid or is purchased privately. 
The interaction between the ADA and managed care is complex, and different issues can 




Managed care has its roots in employment-based health insurance. In recent years, 
however, managed care has become increasingly commonplace as a means of organizing and 
paying for health care for publicly insured persons with disabilities. This trend is expected to 
continue as Congress expands Medicare and Medicaid coverage for persons with disabilities 
who work. Equally as important, attitudes about disability and work have undergone a 
fundamental shift, and the number of persons with disabilities who work is growing. As the 
number of workers with disabilities increases, policy makers can be expected to focus greater 
attention on the issue of how the employment-based health insurance system treats workers 
with disabilities. Recent legislative reforms such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act and the Mental Health Parity Act are evidence of Congressional 
willingness to limit the discretion of insurers to offer – and employers to purchase – 
managed care products whose design features discriminate against persons with disabilities. 
Furthermore, in this atmosphere, the number of challenges to discriminatory insurance and 
managed care practices under the ADA can be expected to grow 
 
 
The Content and structure of the ADA and its application to managed care 
 
 
The ADA contains a series of titles, each of which creates its own duties and 
obligations for entities covered by the title in question. 
 
Managed care arrangements furnished through employer-sponsored health plans. Title 1 applies 
to employers and protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination in the 
work place. Title 1 reaches employee benefits, including health coverage. Recent judicial 
interpretations of the provisions of Title 1 establish limitations on who can be considered 
disabled in an employment discrimination context. These decisions provide that persons 
whose impairments can be corrected or mitigated through drugs or devices to the point at 
which they function as would an individual without an impairment cannot be considered 
disabled under the law. At the same time, these decisions clarify that the mere availability of 
effective treatment does not eliminate the existence of a disability if in its corrected state the 
impairment still limits major life activities. While these decisions can be expected to have 
some impact on the ability of persons with mental illness to bring employment-based ADA 
claims, the Act would nonetheless cover any individual whose impairment, when treated, 





In deciding whether employer insurance practices are discriminatory under the ADA, 
courts and federal agencies tend to distinguish between questions of benefit design (macro- 
allocation issues) and specific application of benefits to individual cases (micro-allocation). 
In the case of employee health plan features that exclude or limit care for entire classes of 
conditions (such as mental illness), courts generally have been unwilling to find 
discrimination under the ADA and instead continue to permit employers to make across- 
the-board design decisions that are permissible as long as they apply to everyone. At the 
same time, limitations and exclusions that single out specific conditions have been 
considered to violate the Act, as have been individual treatment decisions that result in the 
denial of coverage on the basis of a disability. Other critical design and structural issues in 
managed care-style insurance such as network composition and physician incentive plans are 
only now beginning to receive ADA review in the courts. Federal guidance is extremely 
limited, and it is unclear whether these practices, if discriminatory, nonetheless would be 
permissible as a legitimate exercise of employee health plan benefit design. In recent 
months, federal agencies have shown increased willingness to classify as discriminatory 
employer health plan practices in the area of mental health that previously might have been 
considered permissible only a few years ago. 
 
Managed care plans as public accommodations. Even where no employment-based claim 
can be made, an individual member of a managed care plan may nonetheless have a claim 
against the company under the public accommodations title of the ADA (Title III). With 
respect to questions of physical access, courts have held that managed care companies 
constitute places of public accommodation and thus are obligated to make their services 
accessible to persons with disabilities. With respect to issues related to the content of 
insurance itself, courts are split over the issue of whether companies can design and market 
products whose content discriminates against persons with disabilities. As with Title I 
claims, courts differ over the extent to which the ADA acts as a check on the content of 
insurance itself. Similar issues might arise under the ADA with respect to other aspects of 
managed care products such as networks, treatment guidelines, and incentive arrangements. 
To the extent that these features are viewed as integral to the insurance product, their 
discriminatory impact might be perceived to be beyond the reach of courts. However, 
several courts have allowed Title III claims that focus on the structure of insurance, 
effectively viewing the ADA as a limiting force on what types of products insurers can 
market. 
 
Publicly sponsored managed care plans. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by 
public entities, including state and local governments. Discrimination is prohibited both 
directly and indirectly through contract. Thus the ADA applies to publicly purchased 
managed care products. Despite the lack of federal guidance, a review of the Center for 
Health Services Research and Policy’s contracts data base compiled for Negotiating the New 
Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid Managed Care Contracts reveals that numerous 
states have attempted to define the types of managed care practices that would constitute a 
violation of the law. Most states focus on matters involving physical access; several address 
issues relating to coverage limits, networks, and other features that can have a significant 
impact on access to treatment. 
 
The insurance safe harbor. The ADA extends to the insurance industry a “safe harbor” 





would have to be able to demonstrate that its product is legal under applicable law and that 
its practices are actuarially sound are not a subterfuge for discrimination. While the 
existence of a safe harbor is considered by many to be evidence of the fact that Congress 
intended to reach issues of insurance content and structure through the ADA, the courts are 
split over this issue. Thus, the safe harbor defense has rarely been invoked, since courts do 
not consistently conclude that the ADA reaches insurance content questions. In those cases 
in which the safe harbor defense has arisen, insurers either have admitted that their limits 





Managed care brings into sharp focus the lack of federal guidelines regarding 
whether the ADA reaches questions of benefit design and what constitutes a benefit design 
matter. The presence of an insurance safe harbor defense suggests that the ADA was 
intended to reach not only individual instances of discrimination, but also basic benefit 
design decisions by purchasers and insurers, regardless of whether they concern specific 
disabilities or entire classes of conditions. Mental illness presents perhaps the most 
compelling reason for resolving this issue, whether through agency action or in Congress, 
since discriminatory limitations related to mental illness are so widespread. 
 
In addition, federal guidelines are needed for publicly purchased products, 
particularly Medicaid managed care. Because the ADA definition of disability is far broader 
than that used to determine disability under the Social Security Act, the actual number of 
beneficiaries with ADA-level disabilities who are enrolled in Medicaid managed care on a 
mandatory basis could be considerable. The use of mandatory managed care raises 
important issues regarding the safeguards that should be in place as a means of ensuring that 
state programs reasonably accommodate the needs of members with disabilities. State 
agencies have made considerable strides in this area, but guidance is needed regarding 
enrollment, access, networks, coverage decision-making, physician incentive plans, and 
quality. 
 
Of special importance is the issue of risk-adjusted premiums. In order to ensure 
non-discriminatory treatment of enrollees with mental illness, state agencies might need to 
risk-adjust their premium payments as a reasonable accommodation. The issue of risk- 
adjusted premiums raises further questions regarding federal Medicaid regulations that place 
strict upper limits on payments to managed care organizations. To the extent that these 
regulations prevent Medicaid agencies from making reasonable accommodations in the case 







This Issue Brief, prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, examines the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its relationship to 
managed care for persons with mental illness and addiction disorders. Part 1 discusses the 
growing interest in managed care and its relationship to persons with disabilities. Part 2 
provides an overview of the ADA and its application to publicly and privately sponsored 
managed care-style health insurance arrangements. Part 3 presents an overview and 
analysis of ADA-related performance specifications contained in comprehensive service 
agreements between state Medicaid agencies and managed care organizations. These 
specifications are excerpted from Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of 
Medicaid Managed Care Contracts,1 an annual study of Medicaid managed care contracts 
supported in part by SAMHSA. 
 
The ADA applies to both privately and publicly sponsored managed care-style health 
insurance arrangements, including arrangements provided through employer-sponsored 
health plans, other forms of privately purchased coverage, managed care arrangements 
sponsored by state Medicaid and CHIP agencies, and Medicare-sponsored plans. 
Furthermore, at least some recent legal rulings suggest that the ADA’s protections reach not 
only the physical access of managed care services, but the actual structure and design of 
managed care. The ADA thus may act as a limiting force on the amount of discretion the 
insurance industry has over the design of the products it sells, as well as the discretion that 
employers have over the structure and content of what they choose to purchase. 
 
The nexus between the ADA and managed care raises particularly important issues 
for state Medicaid agencies. The ADA definition of disability is far broader than the more 
narrow definition of disability under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) programs. Thus, in light of the reduced health status of 
Medicaid beneficiaries generally (with a particularly disproportionate level of mental illness- 
related disorders),2  a significant proportion of all Medicaid managed care enrollees could be 
considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA. This estimate of a high prevalence of 
ADA-defined disability among Medicaid managed care enrollees is consistent with other 
research that shows that AFDC-related Medicaid managed care enrollees have health care 
costs that are significantly higher than those of their non-Medicaid counterparts.3 Since 
enrollment into some form of managed care is compulsory for the majority of non- 
institutionalized Medicaid beneficiaries, a central question becomes the types of reasonable 
accommodations that state agencies must ensure are in place before mandating enrollment as 
a condition of eligibility.  The United States Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v 
L.C.4 has served to focus new attention of Medicaid in an ADA context.5 
 
 
1 The George Washington University Medical Center, School of Public Health and Health Services, Center for 
Health Services Research and Policy, Washington, DC (1998). 
2 Studies of the welfare population reveal, for example, that up to 30% can be considered to have an activity- 
limiting impairment. See, e.g., Pamela Loprest and Gregory Acs, A Profile of Disability Among Families on AFDC 
(Urban Institute, Washington D.C., 1996). 
3 W. Pete Welch and Martia Wade, “Relative Costs of Medicaid Enrollees and the Commercially Insured in 
HMOs,” Health Affairs 14:2 (Summer, 1995) pp. 212-224. 






There are currently no express federal standards governing Medicaid managed care in 
an ADA context, just as there are no managed care-specific ADA standards for employee 
benefit plans. Despite this fact, our analysis of contracts between state Medicaid agencies 
and managed care organizations indicates that agencies have made a significant effort to 
interpret and give meaning to the ADA in a managed care context. At the same time, many 
unresolved issues in the ADA/managed care relationship remain. 
 
Part 1. Overview 
 
Enacted in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act6 represents a landmark advance 
in civil rights law. Building on earlier protections under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
19737 (which applies to federally funded and conducted activities), the ADA extends anti- 
discrimination protections well beyond prior law, reaching private employment, all publicly 
funded services, and public accommodations, including services operated by private entities. 
 
Since its enactment, the ADA has generated extensive efforts to interpret and apply 
its provisions to a range of situations, including health insurance, whether individually 
purchased, publicly purchased, or employer-sponsored. However, despite the fact that 
ADA-based litigation against managed care companies appears to be rapidly increasing, 
many important issues remain unanswered. 
A growing focus on the relationship between managed care and persons with 
disabilities 
 
Managed care has its roots in the employment-based health insurance system. The 
earliest efforts at prepaid health care arrangements were found in health plans created in the 
early part of the century for teachers, farmers, laborers, and other workers.8 Consequently, 
the managed care experience for persons with significant disabilities is relatively recent, 
spurred on in part by the increasing use of managed care arrangements for Medicare and 
Medicaid  beneficiaries.9 
 
For purposes of the ADA, however, perhaps an even more significant managed care- 
related development has been the sea-change in attitudes and beliefs regarding employment 
by persons with disabilities. Over the past decade, and in great part because of passage of 
the ADA, enormous strides have been made in overcoming outmoded beliefs and attitudes 
regarding disability and employment. This shift led, among other things, to the 1999 
enactment of The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act,10  which offers 
 
 
5 For a review of the Olmstead decision, see Sara Rosenbaum, Olmstead v L.C.: Implications for Persons with Mental 
Illness and Addiction Disorders, Center for Health Services Research and Policy (Washington, DC) (1999) available 
at:             http://www.samhsa.gov/mc/Managed%20Care%20Contracting/Olmstead_v_LC/olmstead.html. 
6 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213. 
7 29 U.S.C. §794. 
8 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (Basic Books, N.Y., 1982). 
9 See, e.g., Marsha Regenstein and Christy Schroder, “Medicaid Managed Care for Persons with Disabilities: 
State Profiles,” Prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Washington, DC 
(December,  1998). 





major new opportunities to ensure that workers with disabilities do not lose Medicare and 
Medicaid benefits. 
 
These changing attitudes also have caused policy makers to focus on how the design 
of employment based health plans create access and coverage barriers for workers with 
disabilities. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),11 
which limits the use of preexisting exclusion clauses, as well as the Mental Health Parity Act 
of 1996,12 which seeks to eliminate coverage disparities in the design of employee health 
benefit plans, are both evidence of policymakers’ interest in reducing the potential for 
discrimination in the design of employee health benefit plans, as well as other forms of 
health insurance marketed to public and private purchasers. 
 
As managed care has become the principal means by which the working-age 
population receives health insurance, the proportion of enrollees with  disabilities 
undoubtedly has increased. This is especially true for persons who work at jobs where only 
one form of health coverage is offered, as well as publicly insured individuals.13 Furthermore, 
voluntary enrollment in managed care by persons  disabilities  also  can  be  expected  to  be 
more common because of the tendency (at least until recently) on the part of managed care 
companies to market enrollment by offering additional  benefits.14 It should comes  as  little 
surprise, therefore, that there appears to have been a major leap  in  recent  years  in  the 
number of ADA-based lawsuits challenging not only individual practices by managed care 
companies in the area of access to care, but also the very structure, content, and design of 




Part 2. The Structure of the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
its Application to Managed Care Arrangements 
 
The ADA consists of separate titles, each of which has relevance to the question of 
managed care, depending on the characteristics of the individual who alleges discrimination, 
whether the individual’s plan membership itself is employer sponsored or made available 
through other means, and the extent to which the managed care arrangement can be viewed 
as a public accommodation. Several sets of federal regulations are relevant to an ADA 
discussion, since different agencies oversee and enforce the law. Each separate title contains 




11 Pub. L. 104-191, amending ERISA, the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code. 
12 Pub. L. 104-204. 
13 Data from employer surveys suggest that many employers now offer a choice of only one plan organized on 
a managed care basis (i.e., a plan that utilizes a network of participating providers over which the company 
exerts selection, practice, and utilization controls).  Employer sponsored plans tend to be somewhat more 
loosely organized, using cost-sharing techniques rather than tight management and heavy network restrictions 
to control access and utilization. See Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law and the 
American Health Care System (Foundation Press, Old Westbury, NY, 1997; 1999-2000 Supplement) at Ch. 
2(J). 
14 For example, recent decisions by managed care plans to reduce the extent of their prescribed drug coverage 
in their Medicare plans led to numerous stories regarding the number of Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities, 





actions may constitute discrimination, what types of defenses may be available, and which 
party bears the burden of proof at different stages of an ADA-related matter. 
 
A. Managed care arrangements furnished through employer-sponsored health 
plans 
 
Key Elements of the Law 
 
In the case of persons whose managed care membership is sponsored by an 
employer as an employee benefit, Title I of the ADA,15 relating to employer discrimination, 
is relevant. Federal regulations implementing Title I make it unlawful for a “covered entity” 
to 
 
discriminate on the basis of a disability against a qualified individual with a disability in 





(c) Rates of pay or any other form of compensation and changes in compensation; 
 
(f) fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the covered 
entity.16  [Emphasis added] 
 
Federal  guidelines  issued  by  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Commission  (EEOC) 
clarify that health insurance is a form of fringe benefit covered by Title I.17 
 
Under Title I, a “covered entity” means, among other things, an employer18 with “15 
or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person”.19 The term “employer” 
does not include the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the United States 
government, or an Indian tribe.20 As a result, federal employees would not be covered by 
the provisions of Title I, although they are covered by sections 501 and 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.21 
 
Under Title I, the term “disability” means 
 
(1) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; 
 
(2) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment.22 
 
15 42 U.S.C. §12111 et seq. 
16 29 C.F.R. §1630.4. 
17 EEOC, Interim Policy Guidance on ADA and Health Insurance (June 8, 1993). 
18 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(b). 
19 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(e). 
20 29 U.S.C. §1630.2(e)(2)(i). 
21 29 U.S.C. §§791 and 794. 
22 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(g).  The rule also defines physical or mental impairment to include any mental or 








A “qualified individual with a disability” means 
 
an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other 
job-related requirements of the employment position *** and who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.23 
 
Pursuant to the statute, the rules specifically exclude from the term “disability” and 
the term “qualified person with a disability” individuals who are “currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs.” The rules also specify that this exclusion does not apply to persons 
who “have successfully completed” a supervised drug rehabilitation program and are “no 
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs” or who “otherwise [have] been rehabilitated 
successfully and [are] no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”24 In addition, the rules 
specify that an individual shall not be denied health services provided in connection with 
drug rehabilitation on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs if the individual is 
otherwise entitled to services.25 Homosexuality and bisexuality are not considered 
impairments and as such are not disabilities under the ADA, and the rules exclude for Title I 
purposes persons who have transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, 
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual 
behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive 
substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.26 
 
In addition to the direct prohibition against discrimination, the rules prohibit 
covered entities (in this case, employers) from 
 
Participat[ing] in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of 
subjecting the covered entity’s own qualified *** employee with a disability to the 
discrimination prohibited by this part.27 
 
The term “contractual arrangement” is defined to include “an organization providing 
fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity.”28 Thus, where an employer contracts 
with a managed care organization or other insurer either to furnish an insured health plan 
product or administer a self-insured plan, the employer may not avoid through contract the 
same obligations that would apply to situations where the employer provides the benefit 
directly. 
 
The rules also prohibit employers and covered entities from using 
 
 
specific learning disabilities.  See §1630.2(h) for additional definitions of “major life activities” and 
“substantially limits”. See 29 C.F.R. §§1630.2(k) and (l) for definitions of having a “record” of an impairment 
or being “regarded as having” an impairment. 
23 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m). 
24 29 C.F.R. §§1630.3(a) and (b). The rules permit covered entities to adopt or administer reasonable policies 
including drug testing to ensure that individuals continue to meet the exemption to the illegal drug use 
exclusion. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(c). 
25 28 C.F.R. §35.131(b) (Title II) and 28 C.F.R. §36.209(b) (Title III). 
26 29 C.F.R. §1630.3(d). 
27 29 C.F.R. §1630.6(a). 






criteria or methods of administration, which are not job-related and consistent with business 
necessity, and (a) that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.29 
 
The rules require employers and other covered entities to make “reasonable 
accommodation” to the 
 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a 
disability unless the covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of its business.30 
 
The regulations also make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a 
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified 
individual is known to have a family, business, social, or other relationship or association.31 
 
The ADA permits employers and covered entities involved in the provision of 
employment benefits to claim several different types of defenses to charges of 
discrimination.32 Many of the defenses allowed under the rules are relevant where the issue 
involves discrimination in employment itself. For purposes of this analysis, the most 
relevant defense is raised when an employer or an employer plan is faced with a “disparate 
treatment” charge; it entails demonstrating that “the challenged action is justified by a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” A second relevant defense is the “direct threat” 
defense, which provides that a qualification standard adopted by an employer may include a 
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the 
individual or others in the workplace.33 A third relevant defense, discussed at greater length 
below, is the “safe harbor” defense. This is an affirmative defense available to insurers 
against whom a prima facie case of discrimination has been made. 
 
Application of the ADA to Employer-Sponsored Managed Care Arrangements 
 
Individuals who seek to bring a claim against their employers for violation of Title I 
in the provision of managed care benefits must be able to prove several basic matters: 
 
➢ First, that they are disabled within the meaning of the Act; 
 
➢ Second, that they are “qualified” persons with disabilities; 
 
➢ Third, that the entity that has allegedly committed the discrimination is a “covered 
entity”; and 
 
➢ Fourth,  that  a  form  of  discrimination  prohibited  under  the  Act  and  implementing 




29 29 C.F.R. §1630.7. 
30 29 C.F.R. §1630.9. 
31 29 C.F.R. §1630.8. 
32 29 C.F.R. §1630.15. 






Proving the Existence of a Disability 
 
In order to be able to make a claim under the ADA, an individual must be “disabled” 
within the meaning of the law. In the case of employees, a series of recent Supreme Court 
decisions creates important new issues that must be considered. During its Spring, 1999 
term, the Court issued three rulings regarding the meaning of disability under the ADA. 
Sutton v United Airlines34 involved two sisters with severe myopia whose condition was 
correctable with eyeglasses and who sued under the Act when their applications for 
commercial pilot licenses were rejected on the basis that their uncorrected vision fell below 
FAA-approved standards. Murphy v United Parcel Service35 involved an individual who was 
rejected for a job as a driver because of a condition (in this case, hypertension) that when 
medicated, permitted the plaintiff to carry out all normal daily activities as would a non- 
disabled person but that when untreated, fell below Department of Transportation (DOT) 
standards. Albertsons, Inc. v Kirkingburg36 involved a driver whose uncorrected vision similarly 
disqualified him for his job under DOT standards. 
 
Citing the potential reach of the ADA were disabilities to be measured in their 
uncorrected state, the Court held that for an impairment to be considered a disability under 
the Act, it must be evaluated in its corrected state and therefore, that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that even when corrected, the impairment substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.37     The majority concluded that 
 
A disability exists only where an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, not 
where it “could” or “would” be substantially limiting were mitigating measures not taken. A 
person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measure 
does not have an impairment that presently “substantially limits” a major life activity.38 
 
The majority also held that: 
 
[t]he use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve one’s disability. Rather, one has a 
disability under [the Act] if notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual is 
substantially limited in a major life activity. *** The use or nonuse of a corrective device 
does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on 
whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially 
limiting.39 
 
The Court further held that a plaintiff may rely on the “regarded as” standard only 
where the employer mistakenly believes either that there is an impairment or that the 
impairment limits life activities. Nor did the Court believe that the “regarded as” test could 
be met by the allegation that the opportunity to work in the chosen field (e.g., an airline 




34 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
35 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). 
36 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). 
37 Sutton, slip op. at 8. 
38 Id. at 9. 





failed to show that their impairments prevented them from engaging in at least a broad class 
of jobs.40 
 
Of additional importance to the Court was the fact that in its preamble, the ADA 
itself states that some 43 million Americans have a disability. Were the Act held to reach 
persons with conditions that effectively could be completely corrected, the majority 
concluded that the number of individuals potentially covered by the Act would swell to 
approximately 160 million individuals, a result that in the majority’s view was not intended 
by Congress. 
 
These decisions create important limitations on the ability to bring ADA claims. In 
order to be able to invoke the Act’s protections, an individual must be able to demonstrate 
that despite correction his or her impairment continues to significantly affect a major life 
activity. Yet the very health care whose availability may be the subject of the litigation may 
yield sufficient benefit so that the individual is able to function as would a person without 
the impairment. How these decisions play out in subsequent cases involving claims of 
discrimination in health benefits by persons with mental illness remains to be seen. To the 
extent that an individual with either a physical or mental impairment can demonstrate that 
medication or devices that control or mitigate its effects nonetheless leave her significantly 
limited in major life activities, proving the existence of a disability will still be possible. 
Because this type of claim is intensely factual, a significant amount of evidence regarding the 
effects of treatment for mental illness and addiction disorders on every day functioning and 
major life activities will be determinative of the viability of a claim under the Act. 
 
Proving one’s status as a qualified person with a disability 
 
Beyond proving the existence of a disability, individuals also must demonstrate that 
they are “qualified individuals with disabilities.”  Until recently, courts have held that in order 
to raise an ADA claim based on Title I, an individual must be a current employee.41 At least 
one court now has held that former employees may invoke ADA protections. In Ford v 
Shering-Plough,42 the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ADA extends 
the reach of Title I to former employees. Shering-Plough, like many ADA cases, involved 
limitations on services for persons with mental illness.  In this case the facts revolved around 
a long-term employer-sponsored disability plan that placed a two-year cap on coverage for 
mental, but not physical, disabilities. The Shering-Plough case is important because of its 
holding that for purposes of Title I, individuals who claim discrimination involving fringe 
benefits that are designed to be furnished on a post-employment basis (e.g., disability benefits 
and COBRA continuation benefits43) are still considered employees for purposes of Title I. 
 
 
40 Id. at 17-18. 
41 Gonzales v Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F. 3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996); EEOC v CAN Insurance Companies, 96 F. 3d 
1039 (7th Cir. 1996). 
42 145 F. 3d 601(3rd Cir. 1998). 
43 Continuation benefits (known as “COBRA” benefits after the name of the federal law that created the right 
to such coverage) permit certain individuals to continue to obtain health coverage following termination of 
employment in the case of “qualifying events”. 29 U.S.C. §1161 et seq. Common “qualifying events” are illness 
and disability, termination of employment, divorce, or death of a covered spouse. Only an estimated 20  
percent of all persons eligible for COBRA continuation benefits actually elect to participate, since employers 






Who is a “covered entity”? 
 
Under Title I cases alleging discrimination by a health insurer, the question arises as 
to whether the insurer is a “covered entity” within the meaning of the ADA. Insurers that 
provide benefits under employer sponsored plans may insure the benefits; alternatively, they 
may administer the benefits on behalf of an employer that self-insures. The issue in such 
cases is whether the entity committing the acts that are the subject of the suit can be viewed 
as the “agent” of the employer. Federal regulations defining entities would appear to 
prohibit insurers from escaping liability in these situations, and courts have agreed.44 
 
Types of employee health benefit practices to be challenged: benefit design matters 
versus individual coverage and treatment decisions 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental question regarding the application of the ADA to 
health insurance, including managed care, is what types of practices can be challenged. As a 
general matter, in cases brought against employers for unfair treatment under employee 
health benefit plans, courts tend to distinguish between benefit design matters on the one hand 
(e.g., what to cover, how much to cover, and other issues that go to the basic design of the 
benefits extended to employees) and on the other hand, challenges to the application of the 
benefits that are offered in individual cases. Issues of benefit design can be thought of as 
“macro-allocation” questions; that is, they concern how the employer elects to allocate for all 
employees the resources that it has committed for health care. The second issue is one of 
“micro-allocation”; it involves individual decisions regarding whether and how benefits that 
in fact are covered will be furnished to particular individuals. Put another way, macro- 
allocation issues are those that determine the structure of the benefit plan for all members 
and affect every member of the group regardless of individual health needs; micro-allocation 
issues arise when the terms of coverage are applied to individual cases. 
 
In employee health benefit law generally, courts have tended to give employers 
absolute discretion over issues of benefit design. The core question becomes whether or not 
the ADA limits this discretion. In McGann v H and H Music Co.,45 a seminal employee health 
benefit discrimination case decided prior to the effective date of the ADA, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an employer did not violate the anti- 
discrimination provisions of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) 
when it elected to modify its benefit plan to furnish far fewer benefits for persons with HIV, 
AIDS, and AIDS-related conditions. Once the ADA became effective, the obvious question 
was whether such benefit design limits were still legal. 
 
The resounding answer from federal agencies and the courts has been unwaveringly 
confusing. Initial rulings by the EEOC suggest that across-the-board benefit limitations that 
single out specific conditions and illnesses for disparate treatment may in fact be unlawful. At the 
 
 
covered individuals may be somewhat more likely to be persons who have a significant need for continued 
coverage and therefore are willing to pay the entire cost of the premium. 
44 See Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. Of New England, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 77 
., 1997).  See also Lee v California Butchers’ Pension Trust Fund, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21899 (9th Cir. 1998). 





same time, however, the EEOC declared that design limitations that apply to entire classes 
of conditions or treatments are acceptable. In recent months the EEOC appears to have 
rethought this latter position, but in the meantime, most courts which have reviewed the 
issue have concluded that the ADA does not limit an employer’s discretion to include class- 
wide, across-the-board benefit limitations. The continuation of this practice has been most 
evident in the case of mental illness coverage restrictions. 
 
According to the EEOC: 
 
*** The ADA *** prohibits employers from indirectly discriminating on the basis of 
disability in the provision of health insurance. *** 
 
III. Disability-Based Distinctions 
 
A. Framework of Analysis 
 
Whenever it is alleged that a health-related term or provision of an employer 
provided health insurance plan violates the ADA, the first issue is whether the challenged 
provision is, in fact, a disability-based distinction. *** [If the Commission determines that 
the challenged term or provision is a disability-based distinction, the employer must provide 
that (1) the health insurance plan is “bona fide” and (2) that the challenged distinction is not 
being used as a subterfuge]. 
 
B. What is a Disability-Based Distinction? 
 
***Not all health-related plan distinctions discriminate on the basis of disability. 
Insurance distinctions that are not based on disability, and that are applied equally to all 
insured employees, do not discriminate on the basis of disability and so do not violate the 
ADA. 
 
For example, a feature of some employer provided health insurance plans is a distinction between 
the benefits provided for the treatment of physical conditions on the one hand and the benefits provided for the 
treatment of ‘mental/nervous’ conditions on the other. Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the 
treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions. *** Such 
broader distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar conditions and which constrain 
individuals both with and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability. Consequently, 
although  such  distinctions  may   have   a   greater   impact   on   certain   individuals   with   disabilities, 
they  do  not  intentionally  discriminate  on  the  basis  of  disability  and  do  not  violate  the  ADA. 
 
Blanket pre-existing condition clauses that preclude from coverage *** the 
treatment of conditions that predate an individual’s eligibility for benefits under the plan also 
are not distinctions based on disability and do not violate the ADA.46 Universal limits or 
exclusions from coverage *** are likewise not insurance distinctions based on disability. 
Similarly, coverage limits on medical procedures that are not exclusively, or nearly exclusively 
utilized for the treatment of a particular disability are not distinctions based on a disability. 
*** 
 
In contrast, however, health-related insurance distinctions that are based on 





46 Note that the EEOC guidance was written prior to enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and 






particular disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS, schizophrenia), a discrete groups of disabilities *** 
or a disability in general. 47  [Emphasis added] 
 
In reviewing cases involving employment-based health benefit plans, courts generally 
have followed this distinction between across-the- board exercises of purchasing discretion 
and disability based distinctions. In construing the obligations of companies administering 
employee health benefit plans under the ADA’s public accommodations theory (discussed 
below), courts have generally upheld across-the-board limits on coverage of mental illness 
and other conditions. A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals in Kimber v 
Thiokol Corp.48 is emblematic of the direction pursued by courts: 
 
While [Thiokol's disability] plan differentiated between types of disabilities, this is a far cry 
from a specified disabled employee facing differential treatment due to her disability. Every 
[Thiokol] employee had the opportunity to join the same plan with the same schedule of 
coverage, meaning that every [Thiokol] employee received equal treatment. So long as every 
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future 
disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different 
coverage for various disabilities. The ADA does not require equal coverage for every type of 
disability; such a requirement, if it existed, would destabilize the insurance industry in a 
manner definitely not intended by Congress when passing the ADA. Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 
850, 142 L.Ed.2d 704 (1999). The Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also addressed 
the same issue and arrived at the same conclusion. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 
170 (4th Cir.1999) (holding that "the ADA does not require a long-term disability plan that is 
sponsored by a private employer to provide the same level of benefits for mental and 
physical disabilities."); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th 
Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998) ("The 
disparity in benefits provided in the policy at issue is also not prohibited  by  the  ADA 
because the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different 
disabilities."); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir.1996) ("a plan  that 
promised [employees] long-term benefits from the onset of disability until age 65 if their 
problem was physical, and  long-term benefits for two years if the problem was mental or 
nervous" did not violate the ADA). See also Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 
674, 678 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that excluding one disability from coverage is not a 
disability-based distinction violating the ADA so long as the exclusion applies equally to all 
individuals). 
 
The D.C. Circuit also has ruled on this issue in analyzing the Rehabilitation Act and upheld 
distinctions in benefits based on physical and mental disabilities. Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 
1059, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1094, 117 S.Ct. 772, 136 L.Ed.2d 717 
(1997).  Because the language of disability used in the ADA mirrors that in the Rehabilitation 
Act, we look to cases construing the Rehabilitation Act for guidance when faced with an 
ADA challenge.  See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202, 141 L.Ed.2d 
540 (1998); see also Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir.1996).49 
 
The logic of this across-the-board versus specific-condition distinction is anything 
but clear. Both are forms of benefit design limits. Why it is acceptable to limit treatment for 
an entire class of conditions but not for each enumerated condition has no obvious answer. 
Indeed, had the plaintiff’s policy singled out schizophrenia, it would have been a direct 
violation of EEOC guidelines.  Even the EEOC, as noted in the Kimber decision, appears to 
 
47 EEOC ADA Guidelines (1993 Daily Lab. Rep.). 
48 196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999). 





now recognize the problems with its position, having filed an amicus brief on the plaintiff’s 
behalf. It may be that given other recent developments in mental health policy, this is an 
opportune time for the EEOC to reconsider its earlier positions. However, it is not clear 
whether doing so through agency action alone would affect the outcome of employment- 
based cases, given the history of deference to employer decisions regarding benefit design. 
 
Even were one to conclude that the EEOC’s initial ruling was erroneous and that 
discriminating against classes of conditions is in reality no different from discriminating 
against them one condition at a time, it may be that the benefit design theory is now 
embedded in ADA as a matter of judicial policy, unless and until Congress alters the Act 
itself, much as it has begun to take steps to address other discriminatory design practices 
through such legislation as HIPAA and the Mental Health Parity Act. 
 
The issue of employer discretion over benefit design is not confined to coverage. 
Managed care raises other potential design issues in addition to those directly related to 
coverage and treatment. For example, the composition and membership of a health care 
company’s network or its physician incentive plan, can be alternatively thought of as 
methods of administration or as benefit design matters. What if the incentive plan creates 
significantly higher incentives to withhold treatment in the case of mental illness? Similarly, 
what if waiting times for psychiatric care are twice as long as for other forms of treatment? 
What if the plan places particularly stringent limits on the number of psychiatrists it allows in 
its networks as a means of slowing resource allocation? Can these actions be challenged as 
methods of administration that discriminate against persons with disabilities, or are they 
merely part of the employer’s health plan’s design and thus insulated from challenge under 
the ADA? Several courts appear to be willing to label as “design” matters virtually all 
structural features and characteristics of employer-sponsored health plans, including 
physician incentive plans and treatment guidelines.50  Other courts have shown a willingness 
to consider the effects of such features on the treatment of individuals with disabilities. 
These other cases have tended to arise in a non-employment-based context, and their 
relevance to employer-sponsored plans is not clear. 
 
Federal guidelines on the application of the ADA to managed care arrangements are 
virtually non-existent. As a result, there is no formal policy distinguishing for purposes of 
employee benefit plans what constitutes permissible coverage and treatment limitations 
versus unlawful discriminatory conduct. Without further guidance, drawing the line between 






50 For example, in Herdrich v Pegram, 154 F. 3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh. den. 170 F. 3d 683 (1999), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it is a violation of ERISA to allow physician-owners 
of health plans to both make coverage decisions and treat patients.   The minority found that such conduct is 
merely part of the plan’s design and not reviewable.  The case is now pending before the Supreme Court, and a 
decision is expected by the summer of 2000.  In Jones v Kodak, 169 F. 3d. 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), the United  
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a plan member who was denied necessary alcohol 
rehabilitation treatment had no right to make a claim against her plan, because the inappropriate treatment 






While designing plans to exclude or limit coverage for conditions of illnesses appears 
acceptable, were a health plan administrator to deny medically necessary covered care 
because of an individual’s disability, the denial could be challenged as a micro-allocation 
decision that violates the disability-based distinction prohibitions set forth by the EEOC. 
Thus, for example, were a health plan to find that the presence of a mental illness made care 
for a second physical or mental problem medically unnecessary or inappropriate, such a 
decision probably be considered violative of the Act. 
B. Managed Care Plans as Public Accommodations 
 
The preceding section discussed challenges to managed care arrangements involving 
persons who are qualified disabled individuals, who are employed within the meaning of the 
Act, and who are challenging the practices of an employer or its agent. However, many 
managed care enrollees are not employees and the arrangement they are challenging may not 
be offered by an employer or its agent as an employment benefit. In such situations, Title I 
of the ADA does not apply. However, the ADA appears to offer a separate basis for 
challenging the conduct of managed care companies as public accommodations, regardless 
of whether membership is publicly or privately sponsored. 
 
It is an open question whether a claim that fails because it involves an act committed 
to the discretion of the purchaser nonetheless can succeed if presented as a challenge to the 
discretion of the seller to offer products that discriminate. As with employer cases, the issue 
may come down to whether the discrimination alleged involves differential treatment for a 
single condition versus an entire class of benefits. 
 
Key Elements of Title III 
 
Title III prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation and 
commercial facilities.  Regulations implementing Title III provide that: 
 
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations 
of any place of public accommodation by any private entity who owns, leases (or leases to), 




The “public accommodation theory would appear to apply regardless of whether the 
plan is employer-sponsored, Medicare-sponsored,52 Medicaid-sponsored, or individually 
purchased.53 Under Title III the definition of disability is the same as that used under Title I 
and includes both physical and mental impairments.54 The term “place of public 
accommodation” specifically includes “a pharmacy, an insurance office, professional office 
of a health care provider, or other service establishment.”55    Physicians’ offices and those of 
 
 
51 28 C.F.R. §36.201(a). 
52 In Zamora-Quezada v HealthTexas Medical Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Tx. 1998) a federal district court 
held that a Medicare sponsored plan was covered by the ADA under both a public accommodations theory and 
as a recipient of federal financial assistance. 
53 Woolfolk v Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 






managed care network providers generally have been specifically treated as places of public 
accommodation in cases alleging refusal to treat.56 Thus, a privately or publicly insured 
person who is denied care or treated in a discriminatory fashion by a managed care company, 
either through its provider network or its administrative personnel, would be able to allege 
discrimination against a “place of public accommodation.”57 Whether the content of 
insurance is a public accommodation is another matter. 
 
The types of discrimination prohibited under the public accommodations provisions 
of the law are enumerated in the regulations, which provide in relevant part as follows: 
 
(a) Denial of participation.  A public accommodation shall not subject an individual 
*** on the basis of a disability *** directly or through contractual *** arrangements to a 
denial of the opportunity *** to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. 
 
(b) Participation in unequal benefit. A public accommodation shall not afford an 
individual *** on the basis of a disability *** directly, or through contractual *** 
arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, 
service, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other 
individuals. 
 
(c) Separate benefit. A public accommodation shall not provide an individual *** 
on the basis of a disability *** directly, or through contractual *** arrangements with a 
good, service, facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation that is different or separate 
from that provided to other individuals unless such action is necessary to provide the 
individual *** with a good, service, facility, or privilege, advantage or accommodation, or 
other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others.58 
 
In addition, the law requires places of public accommodation to furnish their 
services in integrated settings: 
 
(a) In general. A public accommodation shall afford *** services *** to an individual with a 
disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. 
 
(b) Opportunity to participate. Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different 
programs or activities provided in accordance with this subpart, a public accommodation 
shall not deny an individual with a disability to participate in such programs or activities that 
are not separate or different.59 
 
Public accommodations are prohibited from coercing, intimidating, threatening, or 
interfering with individuals in their enjoyment of their rights. Examples of such prohibited 
activities are 
 
(1) coercing an individual to deny or limit the benefits, services or advantages to 






56 Bragdon v Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Woolfolk v Duncan, supra, note 53. 
57 Zamora-Quezada, supra note 52. 
58 28 C.F.R. §36.202. 





(2) threatening, intimidating, or interfering with an individual with a disability who 
is seeking to obtain or use *** services ***[.]60 
 
Public accommodations also must make “reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices or procedures when the modifications are necessary to afford goods, [or] services, 
*** to individuals,” unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that “making the 
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the *** services.”61 A public 
accommodation may refer an individual with a disability to another public accommodation if 
the individual seeks or requires treatment or services “outside of the public 
accommodation’s area of specialization” and “if, in the normal course of its operations, the 
referring public accommodation would make a similar referral for an individual without a 
disability.”62 
 
Public accommodation must take “those steps that may be necessary to ensure that 
no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated 
differently *** because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services” unless the public 
accommodation can demonstrate that taking such steps “would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the *** services” or would “result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or 
expense.”63 
 
The rules permit public accommodations to deny services where an individual “poses 
a direct threat to the health and safety of others”.  The term “direct threat” means 
 
(b) *** a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or 
services. 
 
(c) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat *** a public accommodation 
must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment, that relies on 
current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the 
nature and duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will 
actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices or procedures will 
mitigate the risk.64 
 
The list of auxiliary services includes “qualified interpreters” as well as a broad list of 
assistive devices for persons with physical disabilities. 
 
Application of Public Accommodations Theory to Managed Care 
 
Taken together, the public accommodations provisions create a duty on the part of a 
public accommodation, which includes insurance offices and health care providers (the 
service delivery and administrative components of the managed care plan), to make services 
accessible in an effective and meaningful manner to persons with disabilities. While most 
publicized conduct by managed care organizations that might constitute segregation or 
 
 
60 28 C.F.R. §36.206. 
61 28 C.F.R. §36.302(a). 
62 28 C.F.R. §36.302(b). 
63 28 C.F.R. §36.303(a). 





discrimination tend to focus on physical barriers, the Title III rules would also appear to 
prohibit more subtle forms of discrimination such as encouraging persons with mental 
illness not to enroll in a plan, limiting individuals to certain health care providers or settings, 
disenrolling or seeking to disenroll members whose mental illness or addiction disorders 
make care more complex and require more experienced primary and specialty care providers, 
or failing to modify a provider network to include health professionals with experience in 
managing care of persons with mental disabilities. At least one case has found potentially 
violative of the Act physician incentive plans that encourage physicians to deny or delay care 
to persons with disabilities, as well as retaliatory de-selection of physicians who protested 
benefit denials on disabled patients’ behalf.65 
 
A vigorous debate is currently under way in the courts regarding whether the content 
of insurance is to be considered a public accommodation under Title III and thus subject to 
scrutiny, or whether Title III reaches only physical access matters. Much of this debate has 
arisen in the context of employee health benefits where, after failing for some reason to 
make a Title I claim, a plaintiff has then tried to reach coverage issues under Title III. Were 
such a claim to find acceptance, the burden of proof might shift to the insurer to 
demonstrate that its practices are defensible as an insurer safe harbor. Arguing that the 
content of insurance is a public accommodation might afford plaintiffs the opportunity to 
reach not only individual coverage decisions and practices but also issues that in an 
employment-based context might be seen as beyond the reach of the ADA and within the 
purview of employers as a design matter. 
 
As noted in the Kimber decision, supra, one Court of Appeals has recognized the 
legitimacy of a public accommodations claim involving insurance content; virtually all other 
appeals courts have rejected this interpretation of the ADA. The case of Doe v Mutual of 
Omaha,66 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1999, is 
particularly notable, because on appeal the defendant, Mutual of Omaha, stipulated for 
purposes of the appeal that its limitations on coverage for HIV/AIDS services had no 
actuarial basis and was without statistical support. The Kimber case offers additional evidence 
of judicial unwillingness to curb the discretion of either buyers or sellers in the managed care 
market where design features that limit coverage of health conditions are involved. 
 
In sum, Title III offers an alternative basis for claiming discrimination in managed 
care. Service delivery-related barriers appear to be clearly covered by the Act, as are matters 
of physical access. The content of insurance may or may not be covered. Whether in a 
managed care context limits on the content of care can be successfully distinguished from 
limits on service delivery, such as controls over access and utilization, is less than clear. If all 
managed care treatment-related conduct is classified as “design” or “content” (a not 
inconceivable result given the difficulty in managed care of distinguishing between coverage 
and treatment decisions), then the use of Title III to challenge managed care practices might 
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C. Publicly Sponsored Managed Care Plans: Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program 
 
Nearly all Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) agencies 
purchase managed care products for beneficiaries. In addition, Medicare sponsors managed 
care for its beneficiaries. The ADA may reach Medicare-sponsored plans under a public 
accommodations theory. 
 
The ADA, like section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, establishes important 
protections against the provision by public entities of managed care services that 
discriminate against persons with disabilities.67 
 
Key Elements of the Law 
 
Title II covers “services, programs and activities provided or made available by 
public entities, which are defined as state and local governments and departments, agencies, 
special purpose districts or other instrumentalities of state and local governments.”68 
Regulations implementing Title II contain a series of prohibitions: 69 
 
(a) no qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of the disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a 
public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity. 
 
(b) (1) a public entity, in providing any *** benefit or service, may not, directly or through 
contractual *** arrangements on the basis of a disability 
 
(i) deny a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate or 
benefit from the *** service; 
 
(ii) afford a qualified individual with a disability with a *** service that is not equal 
to that afforded others; 
 
(iii) provide a qualified individual with a disability with [a] *** service that is not as 
effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, 






67 In Olmstead v L.C. by Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999), individuals successfully enforced ADA protections 
against state officials, although the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court in part for further 
analysis on the issue of whether to grant injunctive relief against future unlawful conduct. Note that the 
Supreme Court in Olmstead did not address the issue of whether Title II of the ADA is constitutional insofar as 
it permits the recovery of damages against a state agency. However, it is worth noting that during the 1999 
term the Supreme Court handed down several decisions regarding Congress’ powers and state sovereign 
immunity which have been cited as authority for challenging the constitutionality of recovery of damages 
against a state agency under the ADA. See Alsbrook v City of Maumelle, No. 97-1825 (8th Cir. 1999). For an 
excellent analysis of these decisions see Jane Perkins, Supreme Court Blocks Remedies Against State Actions 
(August, 1999), at http://www.healthlaw.org/pubs/199908federalism. 
68 28 C.F.R. §§35.101 and 35.104. 






(iv) provide different  or separate  ***  services to  individuals  with  disabilities *** 
than is provided to others unless  such  action  is  necessary  to  provide  qualified  individuals 
with *** services that are as effective as those provided to others; 
 
(v) aid or perpetuate discrimination *** by providing significant assistance to an 
organization, agency or person that discriminates on the basis of disability ***; 
 
(vii) otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any 
right, privilege, advantage or opportunity enjoyed by others ***. 
 
(3) a public entity may not, directly or through contractual *** arrangements, utilize 
criteria or methods of administration 
 
(i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to 
discrimination ***; 
 
(ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program *** 
 
(7) a public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or 
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the accommodation would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. 
 
(8) a public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out *** an 
individual with a disability *** from fully and equally enjoying any service,  program  or 
activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, 
program or activity being offered. 
 
***(d) A public entity shall administer services, programs and activities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities. 
 
Under Title II, the term disability has the same definition as that used under Title I; it 
also includes the exclusions specified for Titles I and III discussed above.70 A “qualified 
person” is one who, with or without reasonable modifications of rules, policies, or practices, 
meets the “essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services”.71 For purposes of 
Medicaid and CHIP, persons who are eligible for benefits would be considered qualified.72 
 
Issues in the Application of Title II 
 
Consistent with the previous discussion, a Medicaid or CHIP agency, in purchasing 
managed care services, would be prohibited from contracting with entities that discriminate 
against persons with disabilities in the provision of either health care or administrative 
services. For example, in Anderson v Dept. of Public Welfare,73 the court found that the state 
Medicaid agency could be held accountable under Title II for the lack of auxiliary aids and 
services provided by private HMOs participating in mandatory managed care programs. 




70 28 C.F.R. §35.104. 
71 Id. 
72 See Woolfolk v Duncan, supra note 53. 





operating public programs comply with the nondiscrimination requirements.74 The  rules 
suggest that agencies would be required to ensure that networks are sufficient to permit 
equally effective benefits and that network providers do not discriminate. The duty to 
ensure equally effective benefits and non-discrimination might be considered particularly 
great in those states in which enrollment in managed care is a mandatory condition of 
coverage. Moreover, while state agencies can permit persons with disabilities to enroll in 
managed care on a voluntary basis, it is not clear whether a state agency could prohibit 
persons with disabilities from belonging to managed care plans. 
 
An interesting question is whether Medicaid or CHIP agencies can draw disability- 
based distinctions in coverage in contracts with managed care organizations that offer 
products that contain such distinctions. As is the case with questions of employer health 
benefit plan design, across-the-board Medicaid service limits that apply to all conditions 
clearly are permissible under the ADA, in accordance with previously established case law 
under Section 504, whose legal interpretations are expressly incorporated into the ADA.75 
At some point, however, a benefit limit may amount to a discriminatory method of 
administration and thus could violate the ADA, although no federal guidelines exist to guide 
policy makers on where this line might be drawn. 
 
Another interesting issue is the question of reasonable modification. Unlike private 
managed care, Medicaid-purchased managed care products typically use tightly controlled 
networks with no point-of-service option for benefits, other than for  emergency  care. 
Where a Medicaid product network does not include either primary or specialty providers 
who are experienced in the care and management of persons with mental illnesses and 
addiction disorders, an agency may be required to specify that the contractor must modify its 
network in order to ensure that care is equally effective and non-discriminatory. 
 
In sum, Title II of the ADA is broadly conceived and would reach both Medicaid 
agencies and their managed care contractors. The law would appear to require agencies to 
ensure that their managed care plans are designed to ensure equally effective, non- 
discriminatory care, including modification of networks and administrative operations to 
ensure that care is equally effective. Similarly, the rules appear to require agencies to ensure 
that plans modify their operations to ensure that no discrimination in enrollment or 
disenrollment occurs. Since managed care organizations are also places of public 




74 See, e.g., Tugg v Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D. Fla., 1994). 
75 Olmstead, supra note 67. In Alexander v Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), which involved a challenge under §504 to 
the legality of across-the-board service limits in Tennessee’s state Medicaid plan, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that as long as all individuals had equal access to the same services (in this case, 14 days of hospital 
care annually), no violation of §504 existed. In a recent case, Rodriguez v City of New York, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24935 (2nd Cir. 1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a similar type 
of benefit limit (in this case, limits on in-home personal monitoring services for persons receiving home and 
community services under New York’s Medicaid program) was permissible under the ADA because it applied 
to all individuals regardless of status. Thus, in public programs, as with employee benefits, one can see the 
concept of benefit design at work. Whether a benefit design limit that singled out certain conditions expressly 
under Medicaid for dissimilar treatment would be legal is doubtful, just as the legality of such a limit under 





since MCOs would need to make these modifications to their operations as a general 
business matter. 
 
It would appear that agencies could not purchase or permit products that contain 
disability-based distinctions in coverage, particularly since Medicaid programs are not 
insurance and thus do not qualify for “safe harbor” protections. 
 
D. The Insurance “Safe Harbor” 
 
In applying the ADA to health insurance, whether under a Title I employment 
context, a Title II public benefit context, or a Title III public accommodations context, the 
law permits insurers to claim a “safe harbor”, which exempts certain types of insurance 
practices from claims of discrimination.76 
 
Regulations implementing the safe harbor provision in a Title I context provide as 
follows: 
 
(1) An insurer, hospital, or medical  service  company,  health  maintenance  organization,  or 
any agent or entity that administers a benefit plan or similar organizations, may underwrite 
risks, classify risks, or administer such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law. 
 
(2) A covered entity may establish,  sponsor  ***  or  administer  the  terms  of  a  bona  fide  benefit 
plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or 
not inconsistent with state law. 
 
(3) A covered entity may establish, sponsor, observe or administer the terms of a bona fide benefit 
plan that is not subject to state laws that regulate insurance. 
 
(4) The activities  described in *** this section  are permitted unless these activities are being used as 
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act.77   [Emphasis added] 
 
The insurance “safe harbor” thus represents an affirmative defense available only to 
insurers (including managed care organizations). In order to come under the safe harbor, 
the entity must prove three separate elements. First, it must show that that it is operating 
under a “bona fide” benefit plan, meaning in the employer context that the plan meets the 
requirements for formal status as an ERISA-sponsored benefit plan.78 Second, the entity 
must be able to demonstrate that the terms of the plan are based on underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering such risks that themselves are either based on or not 
inconsistent with state law. Third, the entity must show that its activities are not being used 
as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 
 
To trigger the obligation to present a defense  under the insurance safe harbor 
provisions, it is not necessary that a plaintiff prove an intent to discriminate. Instead, where 
discrimination is shown, the burden shifts to the insurer-defendant to demonstrate that the 
allegedly  discriminatory  practice  can  be  justified  through  actuarial  principles.    This 
 
 
76 42 U.S.C. §12201(c). 
77 29 C.F.R. §1630.16(f). 
78 To be a “bona fide” plan, the plan must “exist[] and pay[] benefits.” See EEOC, Interim Policy Guidance on 





interpretation appears to considerably narrow the ADA “safe harbor” in comparison to 
other civil rights laws. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term 
“subterfuge” in the context of the Age Discrimination Act to require a showing of specific 
intent to discriminate before a subterfuge claim can be supported.79 
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice 
have interpreted the “safe harbor” and “subterfuge” provisions to require that any disparities 
in coverage offered under insurance policies be supported by “sound actuarial” principles.80 
The term “sound actuarial principles” is not defined either under the Act or under its 
implementing regulations. Indeed, while the term “sound actuarial principles” shows up in 
numerous federal laws dealing with health insurance, the term remains undefined in all 
contexts. In Zamora-Quesada, supra, a case involving the application of the ADA to Medicare- 
sponsored managed care plans, the Court provided the following interpretation of the 
concept of “sound actuarial principles”: 
 
The safe harbor provision protects an insurer engaged in "underwriting" and "classifying 
risks." Although the [ADA] does not define these terms, underwriting generally refers to the 
application of the various risk factors or risk classes to a particular individual or group for 
the purposes of determining whether to provide coverage. *** Risk classification refers to 
the identification of risk factors and the groupings of those factors which pose similar risks. 
 
Thus, the court in Zamora-Quesada applied the concept of “sound actuarial principles” 
to the threshold decision made by insurers regarding whether to provide coverage at all. 
Whether the insurance safe harbor extends to medical underwriting once coverage actually 
has begun is not clear. 
 
In an actuarial context, the American Academy of Insurance Actuaries, to which 80 
percent of all actuaries currently practicing in the U.S. belong,81 maintains Actuarial 
Standards of Practice (ASOP). According to the Actuarial Standards Board (ASB), which 
issues the standards, a health insurance plan is actuarially sound if projected premiums 
suffice to cover expected costs and administrative expenses and return a profit.82 Under this 
definition, the concept of actuarial soundness would appear to extend not only to initial 
coverage, but also to subsequent decisions that are designed to keep actual utilization in line 
with initial projections. 
 
Although the ADA requires actuarial soundness by insurers, the preceding discussion 
makes clear that this defense becomes necessary only if the particular insurance practice is 
reachable under the ADA to begin with. If the content of coverage is insulated from judicial 
review, either because it is a matter of employer discretion or because the public 
accommodations concept reaches only questions of physical access, then insurers would not 
have to defend their benefit structures as actuarially sound. The admission of no actuarial 
soundness by Mutual of Omaha in the Doe case, cited above, is striking.  But even the most 
 
 
79 Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
80 28 C.F.R. §36.212; DOJ Technical Assistance Manual §III-3.11000; EEOC, Interim Policy Guidance on 
ADA and Health Insurance (June 8, 1993). 
81 Telephone Interview with Dwight K. Bartlett III, Senior Health Fellow, the American Academy of Actuaries 
(Aug. 5, 1999). 





actuarially unsound insurance design choices are perfectly permissible if the authority to 
make such discriminatory choices falls within the discretion of the company selling the 
product or the entity purchasing the product (i.e., an employer, a Medicaid agency, the 




Part 3. Medicaid Managed Care Contracts and the ADA 
 
As noted, there are no federal regulations or guidelines that specifically interpret the 
provisions of the ADA in a managed care context. Therefore, state managed care contracts 
are of interest, because they are evidence of how states interpret the requirements of the 
ADA in their managed care operations. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 at the end of this Issue Brief summarize the scope of state contract 
specifications related to the ADA. The tables indicate two things: First, states have generally 
taken a broad approach to articulating the notion that discrimination based on disability in a 
managed care context is prohibited under the ADA; second, states have done a poorer job in 
articulating the specific affirmative obligations managed care organizations must undertake 
(e.g., to make “reasonable accommodations” to persons with disabilities). As of this time it 
does not appear that any managed care entity has challenged its duties under the law on the 
ground that the state’s expectation of “reasonable accommodation” creates a fundamental 
alteration in the nature of the program or an undue burden on the entity. To the extent that 
state enforcement actions or private challenges to barriers in managed care increase, such 




Table 1 indicates that most, but not all, states include in their specifications a general 
prohibition incorporating the provisions of the Act against discrimination against persons 
with disabilities. State specifications vary considerably in scope. Pennsylvania, Maine, 
Missouri, and Minnesota offer examples of broad provisions that incorporate the 
prohibitions of the federal law. The Missouri contract incorporates both non-discrimination 
and “reasonable accommodation” provisions into a single broad specification that provides 
in relevant part: 
 
2.11 To ensure mainstreaming of program members the 
health plan shall take affirmative action so that members are 
provided covered services without regard to *** physical or 
mental handicap except where medically indicated. Examples 
of prohibited practices include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
2.11.1 Denying or not providing to a member any covered 





2.11.2 Providing to a member any covered service which is 
different, or is provided in a different manner or at a different 
time from that 
provided to other members, other public or private patients, 
or the public at large. 
2.11.3 Subjecting a member to segregation or  separate 
treatment in any manner related to the receipt of any covered 
service. 
2.11.4 The assignment of times or places for the provision of 
services on the basis of  *** physical or mental handicap of 
the participants to be served. 
2.11.5 If the health plan knowingly executes a subcontract 
with a provider with the intent of allowing or permitting the 
subcontractor to implement barriers to care (i.e., the terms of 
the subcontract are more restrictive than this contract), the 
health plan will be in default of its contract. In addition, if 
the health plan becomes aware of any of its existing sub- 
contractors’ failure to comply with this section and does not 
take action to correct this within thirty (30) days, it will be in 
default of its contract. 
 
Missouri RFP, pp. 13-14 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, Part 2, Table 
3.10]. 
 
The Missouri provision clarifies that the contractor’s duties extend to its 
subcontractors and that the contractor has an affirmative duty to correct known instances of 
discrimination. In addition, the provision clarifies that the prohibitions and affirmative 
action provisions extend not only to the manner and setting of care, but also to coverage. 
 
Kansas includes in its contract a general specification that is qualitatively significantly 
different from that found in the Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Maine contracts, as well as 
other contracts that contain broad prohibitions and affirmative  duty  obligations.  The 
Kansas Medicaid program appears to interpret the ADA to permit some differentiation in 
treatment of Medicaid patients, including patients with disabilities, as long as services are 
“sufficient.” The contract does not indicate what is meant by “sufficient,” who determines 
sufficiency, or how it will be measured. The contract appears to give contractors 
considerable discretion to set the amount and level of differentiation and in effect permits 
the separation of Medicaid members including disabled members, as long as the results are 
“sufficient”, as the following language illustrates: 
 
Provide contract services to Medicaid members under this 
contract in the same manner as those services are provided to 
other members of the HMO, although delivery sites, covered 
services and provider payment levels may vary. The HMO 
must guarantee that the locations of facilities and 
practitioners providing health care to members are sufficient 










Specific  applications 
 
Enrollment and service obligations: The majority of contracts specify prohibitions against 
discrimination in enrollment. In most cases, the prohibition against denial of enrollment is 
absolute. This of course raises at least the inference that contractors have an absolute duty 
to serve members equally regardless of their disability status, since otherwise the enrollment 
of such patients could result in sham care arrangements. 
 
Minnesota makes this absolute duty to serve all enrollees explicit through the 
following specification: 
 
The Health Plan must offer appropriate services for the 
following special needs groups when required or requested. 
*** Services must be available within the Health Plan or  
through contractual arrangements with providers. 
 
a. seriously and persistently mentally ill ***; 
c. Abused children and adults, abusive individuals; *** 
f. Dual MI/DD or MI/CD clients ***; 
 
Minnesota Contract, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 
2, Part 2, Table 3-10 (emphasis added)]. 
 
Oklahoma  interprets  the  Act  to  permit  contractors  to  use  their  discretion  in 
enrolling and disenrolling persons with mental handicaps under certain circumstances: 
 
Contractor may not refuse an assignment or seek to disenroll 
a member or otherwise discriminate against a member on the 
basis of *** mental handicap *** except when that condition 
can be better treated by another provider type subject to 
[certain limitations related to state authorization of the 
conduct]. 
 
Oklahoma Contract, p. 14 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, Part 2, Table 
3-10]. 
 
Presumably, the state views its approval authority as a check on the potential for plans to 
disenroll complex and high need patients or patients whom no provider wishes to serve. 
Because a central aspect of managed care is the relationship between members and their 
health care providers the issue of enrollment and service is central. 
 
Disenrollment: Among states that address the issue of disenrollment, there is 





member, particularly where the member is alleged to be abusive, threatening, or non- 
compliant. 
 
Massachusetts offers an example of a specification that places the burden on the plan 
to make explicit showings to the state before a request for the disenrollment of a member 
will be considered: 
 
The Contractor may submit a written request to the Division 
to terminate the enrollment of any Enrollee only if: *** 
b. after reasonable efforts, documented by the Contractor, at 
least three plan physicians are unable to establish a 
satisfactory physician/patient relationship with such enrollee; 
*** 
c. the enrollee has used or attempted to use services delivered 
at an emergency room at least five times for purposes which 
do not meet the definition of emergency services ***, and the 
Contractor has made at least five substantive documented 
attempts to educate the enrollee regarding appropriate 
emergency room use and alternatives to emergency room 
services, and the enrollee continues to seek services in an 
emergency room in non-emergency situations ***; 
d. the enrollee has committed, or attempted to commit, at 
least three documented acts of physical abuse which pose a 
direct threat to individuals responsible for the provision of 
service under this contract or other enrollees. Such acts 
must be unrelated to the enrollee’s physical or mental 
condition. 
 
Massachusetts Contract, pp. 15-16 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, Part 
1, Table 1-7]. 
 
New Mexico, on the other hand, offers an example of a contract that appears to 
delegate the decision entirely to the contractor with no minimum standards set by the 
agency: 
 
Provide your policies and procedures and/or criteria for 
applying for member disenrollment. Provide your definition 
of non-compliance. 
 
New Mexico RFP, p. 51 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, Part 1, 
Table 1.7]. 
 
Coverage: The states that address the issue of coverage do so as part of a broader 
provision that identifies coverage as an area in which contractors are prohibited from 
discriminating. The contracts do not offer more specific applications of coverage situations 
that would be considered discriminatory. The actuarial reasonableness defense discussed 
above would presumably come into play where the conduct at issue involves a managed care 






As noted, the question of discrimination in coverage and service is a complex one, 
particularly where, as in managed care, coverage and delivery tend to be merged into a single 
event. Clearly, providing less coverage for persons because of their mental illness would be a 
violation of the ADA, just as would be the practice of providing the same level of coverage 
but segregating persons with mental illness into separate provider settings. But where 
coverage differentials are justified by medical considerations, or where certain network 
providers are particularly competent to furnish care, one would assume that this type of 
medical justification, if supported by objective facts and evidence, would justify separate 
treatment. 
 
Several contracts (Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Maine) note that distinctions in 
coverage are acceptable if based on medical necessity. This is an area that has not yet been 
addressed in either federal regulations or ADA case law. 
 
As Table 1 indicates, outside of enrollment, few states have even general provisions 
relating to non-discrimination in administration of the health plan, particularly in the area of 
grievances and appeals. A number of states do, however, specify a prohibition against 
discrimination in the employment of persons with disabilities. 
 
Reasonable Modification of MCO Practices 
 
As indicated earlier, far fewer states have addressed the issue of what constitutes a 
reasonable modification of enrollment, coverage, access, and provider services. The concept 
of reasonable accommodation applies to all public services covered by Title II. As a result, 
state Medicaid programs would appear to have a duty to ensure that the managed care 
systems in which they enroll beneficiaries can affirmatively meet their needs. This is 
particularly true in Medicaid where enrollment is typically mandatory as a condition of 
coverage. 
 
The disenrollment provisions reviewed previously can be viewed as states’ attempts 
to not only avoid direct threat situations, but also to provide a reasonable accommodation 
for persons with disabilities for whom managed care may not work well. The Wisconsin 
contract offers another example of how a state has attempted to make a “reasonable 
accommodation” by allowing certain individuals to elect to remain in the fee-for-service 




83 This opt-out provision raises an important Medicaid policy question regarding the modifications that would 
be required in the case of persons with disabilities. According to state Medicaid officials in at least one U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services region, Health Care Financing Administration officials have taken 
the position that states operating mandatory managed care waiver programs under §1915 may not allow certain 
beneficiaries to opt out, even if they cannot be adequately served within a managed care setting. Whether this 
HCFA position in fact places a state in violation of the “reasonable accommodation” provisions of the ADA is 
unclear. According to state Medicaid officials, HCFA’s justification for this position (which arose in the case of 
persons with mental illness) was that without total enrollment, the actuarial basis for the state demonstration 
would be skewed toward healthy enrollees and thereby violate HCFA policy regarding federal financial 
participation in mandatory managed care programs. It would appear that requiring an expansion of a pre- 






For Medicaid recipients who are eligible for HMO enrollment 
under *** this contract, and who are thought to meet one or 
more of the criteria [for exemptions], the AFDC case head 
shall be given the option of enrolling the recipient *** in the 
HMO or applying to have the affected person remain in the 
Medicaid fee-for-service system. *** The HMO shall not 
counsel or otherwise influence an enrollee or potential 
enrollee in such a way as to encourage exemption from 
enrollment or continuing enrollment. 
 
Wisconsin Contract, pp. 83-84 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, Part 1, 
Table 1-4]. 
 
Providers: The Minnesota contract excerpted above provides an example of a state 
that imposes a duty on contractors to get adequate care to members, even if they must go to 
non-network providers to do so. The state of Texas also maintains in its contract an 
affirmative obligation on contractors to ensure that care is appropriate for persons with 
disabilities.  The Texas contract specifies that contractors 
 
shall develop and maintain a system for identifying members 
who have disabilities or chronic or complex medical 
conditions and for providing medically necessary services to 
meet their preventive, primary acute and specialty health care 
needs ***. 
 
HMO shall provide an adequate primary care and specialty 
care provider network *** HMO must also ensure an 
adequate number of specialty physicians who are willing to be 
PCPs and provide medical homes to members with 
disabilities or chronic illness. 
 
Texas Contract, p. 17 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol 2, 
Part 2, Table 3.1]. 
 
Quality measurement: An important question is whether health plans furnish care that is 
of good quality in the case of persons whose underlying disabilities make normal approaches 
to coverage and care insufficient. The obligation to measure the clinical quality of care for 
persons with disabilities does not appear to be a feature of any state contract at this point, 
presumably because the entire area of quality measurement and improvement for persons 
with co-morbidities has scarcely begun to develop. The Illinois contract does require 
companies to include in their clinical studies 
 
medical  management  for  a  limited  number  of  medically  complicated 
conditions as agreed to by the Contractor and the Department. 
 
persons with disabilities to remain in plans that cannot adequately serve them, a requirement that would appear 






Illinois Contract, Appendix A, pp. 2-3 [reprinted in Negotiating the New Health System, Vol. 2, 
Part 3, Table 5.1]. 
 
Oklahoma also provides an illustration  of an effort to reach the very difficult 
question of quality management in the case of persons with disabilities (interestingly, the 
provision does not address the topic of mental disability, however): 
 
Adults with complex/chronic illnesses and physical and 
developmental disabilities 
Contractor must have in place all of the following to meet the 
needs of its adult members with complex/chronic illnesses 
and physical or developmental disabilities ***: 
Satisfactory  methods/guidelines  for  identifying  persons  at 
risk of or having chronic diseases and disabilities and 
determining their specific needs in terms of specialist 
physician referrals, durable medical equipment, home health 
services, etc. *** 
Medical protocols for the diagnosis and treatment of 
conditions common to the Aged, Blind and Disabled 
population ***. 
Children with special health care needs 
Children with special health care needs include those who 
have or are suspected of having a serious or chronic physical 
or developmental condition and who require health and 
related developmental services of a type or amount beyond 
that required by children generally. Contractor will be 
responsible for performing all of the same activities for this 
population as for adults. In addition Contractor must have in 
place for these children *** medical protocols for diagnosis 
and treatment of conditions common to the disabled child 
population ***. 
 








This Issue Brief underscores the complexity of the ADA in a managed care context. 
The ADA is relevant whether membership in a managed care plan is a function of employee 
provided health benefits, individually purchased coverage, or public assistance.  If the ADA 
is understood to reach issues of insurance design and benefit structure, the law would reach 
practices by buyers and sellers that limit coverage for classes of disease and illness. The 
existence of the safe harbor provision of the law would appear to suggest that Congress 
contemplated that benefit design matters would be covered by the Act, although most courts 
have dismissed this argument in public accommodations cases challenging across-the-board 
content limits. Indeed, a review of the federal guidelines in this area underscores an 
interpretation that would favor the application of the ADA to questions of broad benefit 
design.84 
 
Early federal agency guidance appears to suggest that benefit structures that limit 
coverage for entire classes of illness (in particular, mental illness) may be permissible, 
although discrimination against specific conditions would not be. This distinction is neither 
rational nor workable, as the jumble of ADA cases suggests. Indeed, in recent years both 
Congress and the federal agencies  have attempted to remove barriers emanating from 
“across-the-board” benefit design choices through legislation such as HIPAA and  the 
Mental Health Parity Act. 
 
The fundamental question that now confronts policy makers is whether employers 
and insurers should be able to design products that single out entire classes of health 
conditions for differential treatment, even when there is no actuarial basis for such actions. 
This issue will increasingly confront policy makers in the coming years, as persons with 
physical and mental disabilities go to work in ever greater numbers. While Congress may 
continue to slowly redesign Medicare and Medicaid to afford greater coverage for workers 
with disabilities, it is inevitable that at some point lawmakers will be faced with the basic 
question of whether the ADA should apply to the benefit design choices made by insurers 
and purchasers, particularly where no actuarial data to justify the choice is forthcoming. 
Furthermore, to the extent that courts increasingly attribute benefit design status to 
numerous types of insurance practices, such as network composition and physician incentive 
plans, this theory of “immunity through design” threatens to swallow all efforts to establish 
individual protections against discriminatory insurance practices. 
 
Similarly, complex issues await resolution in the area of Medicaid managed care and 
the ADA. Increasingly, persons with disabilities as defined under the ADA are mandated to 
enroll in managed care as a condition of Medicaid eligibility. This trend raises a question 
regarding the types of minimum safeguards that must be in place before mandatory 
enrollment can proceed. How should enrollees with disabilities be informed of  their 
options, counseled, and enrolled? What disenrollment protections apply? What types of 
networks by specialty must be in place, and what types of controls over access to non- 
network providers can agencies permit contractors to use? Can a Medicaid agency mandate 
enrollment if the contractor’s network fails to make reasonable accommodation for such 
 
 





individuals, and how would such reasonable accommodation be measured? Can the entity 
use treatment guidelines that are calibrated to normative managed care patients and practices 
rather than to a special needs population? Can the entity use physician incentive 
arrangements that reward the reduction in unnecessary services in the absence of risk- 
adjusted payments and utilization controls? 
 
This last question is of particular importance. Were an agency to attempt to risk- 
adjust its premium payments in order to permit its contractors to make reasonable 
accommodations to disability-related concerns, how would such enhanced payments fare 
under federal Medicaid regulations that establish strict upper payment limits on Medicaid 
managed care premiums?85 Federal regulations provide that under risk contracts, Medicaid 
payments may not exceed “the cost to the agency of providing those same services on a fee- 
for-service basis to an actuarially equivalent group.” Whether this rule is sufficient to permit 
the level of payment that is necessary to achieve reasonable accommodation in the case of 
persons with disabilities is doubtful, since in the fee-for-service context the term “provides” 
means merely to “pay for”. Simple payment for services may be considerably less costly 
than the amount that would be required to ensure that reasonable accommodations are in 
place to ensure that covered managed care services are actually available to persons with 
disabilities. Clearly, adapting managed care to meet the needs of persons with disabilities 
may result in initial outlays that from an actuarial point of view are considerably higher than 
those that would have been needed under a fee for service system, where the agency’s duty 
was merely to pay for, rather than provide, care. To the extent that federal Medicaid upper 
payment limit rules work to prohibit the risk-adjustment of premiums in order to ensure 
reasonable accommodations, such rules may create additional concerns under the ADA. 
 
Finally, if a Medicaid managed care contractor were to be sued under the ADA, 
could it raise the safe harbor defense? As noted, this question has been answered in the 
negative by at least one court in a Medicare context, since Medicare prohibits medical 
underwriting by health plans. A further question is whether a Medicaid managed care 
product can be considered insurance at all, particularly since many states exempt these 
products from state insurance law. Medicaid is not an insurance program; instead, it 
operates in accordance with a series of third-party financing policies that in virtually every 
respect fundamentally differ from insurance. While Medicaid agencies are permitted to use 
federal funds to buy managed care products, any coverage which agencies extend either 
directly or through their contractors must be consistent with federal coverage and access 
requirements. Thus, the concept of an insurance safe harbor in a Medicaid claim may simply 














85 42 C.F.R. § 447.361. 
